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DYNAMIC CONTENT: THE STRATEGIC  
CONTINGENCY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW* 
 
It is an oft-repeated maxim that international law has undergone 
vast change in the modern era.1  While it is self-evident that the rheto-
ric and preoccupations of international lawyers have indeed trans-
formed from the positivist utterances of nineteenth century European 
diplomats, the discipline of international law has yet to articulate an 
adequate causal explanation for actual continuity and change in the 
legal expectations and obligations of the international community.  
The deleterious effects of this under-theorization are substantial.  In-
ternational law is stuck in a morass of contested doctrinal descrip-
tion.2  Its content, effect, and very existence are grist for incessant 
academic debate and political wrangling.3 
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 1. See, e.g., Michael Kirby, International Law: A Tectonic Change in the Legal Scene, 
Address before the Joint Meeting of the American Society of International Law and the 
Australia-New Zealand Society of International Law, at http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/ 
kirbyj/kirbyj_interlaw.htm (last visited November 24, 2003) (justice of the High Court of 
Australia describing the evolution and growth of international human rights, commercial, and 
intellectual property law); THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION 
AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 9–14 (2002) (detailing the twentieth century 
transition from a permissive use of force regime to United Nations Charter proscriptions); Jack 
L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance Between Modern and 
Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 640 (2000) (describing the 
changing jurisprudence of customary international law). 
 2. See J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 
449, 450–52 (2000) (describing the disarray of international legal theory); Goldsmith & Posner, 
supra note 1, at 641 (describing customary international law as an epiphenomenon of rational 
state behavior); John H.E. Fried, International Law—Neither Orphan Nor Harlot, Neither Jailer 
Nor Never-Never Land, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS 
25, 25–27 (Charlotte Ku & Paul F. Diehl eds., 1998) (describing international law as the “whole 
panorama” of international norms and institutions and describing its primary criticisms). 
 3. See generally Kelly, supra note 2, at 451–84 (“Under the indeterminate and manipu-
lable theory of CIL [Customary International Law], all . . . positions are tenable.  CIL is then a 
matter of taste.  As such, it cannot function as a legitimate source of substantive legal norms in a 
decentralized world of nations without a broad base of shared values.”). 
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Indeed, the catalyst for the entire discipline of modern Interna-
tional Relations (IR) was the perceived moral and intellectual “great 
failure” of the international legal program during the period between 
the two world wars.4  The human cataclysm of World War II, followed 
by the predominance of geo-political security issues during the Cold 
War era, prompted a great number of influential political and aca-
demic commentators to adopt realist assumptions which question 
whether international law is anything more substantial than an epi-
phenomenal symptom of liberal decadence.5  More recently, the in-
ternational acrimony associated with the United States’ decision to 
invade Iraq, and centered at the United Nations (UN), has invigo-
rated a strong current within the Bush administration for formal dec-
laration of international law’s irrelevance to the “problems of our 
time.”6 
Even among legal practitioners who accept customary interna-
tional law (CIL) at face value, disagreement regarding its content is 
interminable.7  While there is a common doctrinal terminology recog-
nized by most international lawyers, these conventions are so malle-
able and theoretically self-contained that they often seem more a 
source of further tension in the law rather than grounds for media-
 
 4. See Martti Koskenniemi, Carl Schmitt, Hans Morgenthau, and the Image of Law in In-
ternational Relations, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 17, 26–27 (Michael 
Byers ed., 2000) (describing how the disillusioning experience of Weimar and the League of Na-
tions led several prominent European refugees to champion a revival of realism in American 
academia and foreign policy following World War II); see also EDWARD H. CARR, THE 
TWENTY YEARS’ CRISIS (1940) (describing the political and normative failure of the legal ideal-
ist program and consequent emergence of modern realism). 
 5. E.g., CARR, supra note 4, 102–12 (“The exposure of the real basis of the professedly 
abstract principles commonly invoked in international politics is the most damning and most 
convincing part of the realist indictment of utopianism. . . . The charge is not that human beings 
fail to live up to their principles. . . . What matters is that these supposedly absolute and univer-
sal principles were not principles at all, but the unconscious reflections of national policy based 
on a particular interpretation of national interest at a particular time.”); Susan Strange, Cave! 
hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 337, 338–42 (Ste-
phen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (calling the emphasis on regime analysis in American international 
legal circles a “special form of nonterritorial imperialism . . . that many American academics, 
brought up as liberals and internationalists, find . . . hard to recognize”); Goldsmith & Posner, 
supra note 1, at 640–41, 660–63 (contrasting the deficiencies of the positivist approach to cus-
tomary international law to a “new” realist, rational choice approach). 
 6. Cf. George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Iraq from Cincinnati, Ohio, 38 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1716, 1719–20 (Oct. 7, 2002), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
stories/2002/10/07/national/main524627.shtml (last visited November 15, 2003) (asserting that 
the UN’s failure to support U.S. action against Iraq would demonstrate the organization’s 
irrelevance to “the problems of our time”) [hereinafter Address to the Nation]. 
 7. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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tion.8  Lacking the tools to articulate or falsify causal claims about in-
ternational law, legal publicists tend to invoke the term as a universal 
justifier for personal normative preferences.  The effect of this cumu-
lative contestation has been to give international law an air of concep-
tual abstraction that significantly undermines its credibility as a be-
havior-channeling factor in world politics. 
Yet, international law remains an intuitively important concept.  
While IR scholars may be able to construct alternate terms calibrated 
to their particular modeling purposes, in the gritty world of policy and 
practice such academic concepts cannot entirely replace the opera-
tional and normative reality of international law.9  At an operational 
level, states explicitly frame their actions in terms of—and energeti-
cally jockey over—its content.10  At a normative one, our universal 
experience in domestic society is that none of the developments typi-
cally associated with liberal human progress—increasing economic 
activity and material well-being; procedural, non-violent political pro-
cesses; reasonable community respect for human dignity—are sus-
tainable without a robust and evolving societal “rule of law.”11  Inter-
national law is, in short, the functional stuff that we have to work with 
in order to effect a civil and durable international society.  It is thus a 
practically important task to ground it in a reasonably determinable, 
useful, and predictive theory of world politics. 
Until relatively recently, such efforts were condemned to failure.  
The assumptions respectively underlying the dominant political and 
legal paradigms of international organization were too incompatible.  
International lawyers quibbled over the legitimacy and applicability 
of given legal norms while realist-dominated IR concerned itself with 
instrumentalist calculations of state interest—a conception of world 
 
 8. See Kelly, supra note 2, at 465–69 (describing the perception defects of CIL giving rise 
to endemic contestation).  The limitations of conventional understandings of international law, 
based on treaty and custom, are considered in detail below. 
 9. See Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 487, 489–95 (1997). 
 10. Law skeptics dismiss these perambulations as casuistry, which of course, they are.  This 
point affords little critical traction, however, as all social laws rely on casuistry, or the extrapola-
tion of principles to new factual circumstances.  See RICHARD POSNER, PROBLEMATICS OF 
LEGAL AND MORAL THEORY 122 (1999) (“The casuistic method has a long history in law and 
ethics; it dates back to Socrates, has adherents in contemporary philosophy . . . , undergirds the 
common law system of England and the United States, and is the cornerstone of American law 
teaching.”).  Without the capacity to adapt the rules to new realities, any system of law, domes-
tic, international, or otherwise will, fairly rapidly, become obsolete. 
 11. Cf. SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW 33–35 (2003) (“The concept 
of Rule of Law . . . is fundamental to a free society”). 
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order with little functional room for international law.12  The increas-
ing sophistication of IR analysis, however, has altered this situation.  
The institutionalist insight into information and coordination, and the 
post-rationalist13 focus on preference formation has reopened a dis-
tinct theoretical space for international law.  This development has 
led to an emergent “interdisciplinarity” between the study of interna-
tional law and IR.  It is once again becoming clear that lawyers and 
IR theorists are talking about the same thing, just using different lan-
guages.  Several recent articles have adopted this mode of analysis to 
re-conceptualize international law as a functional component of world 
politics.14  To date, however, there has been no systematic effort to 
test such a functional theory of international law as a general empiri-
cal claim. 
This paper is intended to redress that lacuna.  It articulates, op-
erationalizes,15 and evaluates a political theory of international law’s 
formation, legitimization, and change.  Part I examines the doctrinal 
problems of contemporary international law from the vantage of H. 
L. A. Hart’s concept of primary and secondary rules.  The section 
concludes with an explanatory theory of international legal continuity 
and change based on secondary principles grounded in complex stra-
tegic interaction.  The theory predicts that when one or more key 
strategic variables change, there will be a consequent evolution in the 
consistency and/or content of associated international legal rules.16  
Part II articulates the causal components of this theory.  It employs 
the successive insights of realism, institutionalism, and post-
rationalism into IR to develop a complex, but reasonably parsimoni-
ous model of strategic interaction predicated on three key variables: 
capabilities, information, and values.  Part II also demonstrates that, 
 
 12. See Keohane, supra note 9, at 488–94. 
 13. The basis and import of the term “post-rationalism” is described in the text infra ac-
companying notes 69–71. 
 14. See generally Karl Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International 
Relations and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538, 538–558 (Wal-
ter Carlsnaes, et al. eds., 2002) (surveying compliance in international law and international re-
lations literature); Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 DUKE L.J. 559 (2002) (attempting to 
reconcile rational choice theory with CIL and responding to Goldsmith and Posner); John K. 
Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and 
International Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 139 (1996) (applying the IR Institutionalist or “Regime 
theory” notion of iteration to the law of treaties as international legal behavior). 
 15. By “operationalize,” I mean translating a theory into terms that can be evaluated by 
empirical or qualitative methods. 
 16. One possible expression for this theory is: ∆ (Complex Strategic Environment) → ∆ 
(International Law).  The analytical content of these variables is articulated below. 
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contrary to the “hard realist” claim that international law is irrelevant 
to world politics,17 law in fact plays a functionally critical role in the 
strategic process.  Part III articulates the dependent variable, interna-
tional legal rules.  Part IV qualitatively applies this theory in the con-
text of the purported international legal prohibitions on slavery, in-
tervention, and landmines.  Finally, Part V assesses the theory in light 
of the cases and draws doctrinal conclusions. 
I.  A THEORY OF SECONDARY RULES 
Any useful law is a prediction of likely consequences.18  Societies 
create social laws to coordinate conduct between actors by predicting 
standard behaviors, and when and how collective decisions will be 
made.19  This function in turn facilitates achievement of society’s in-
strumental and normative ends.  Thus, the law is a functionally-
fashioned tool directed at achievement of man’s common aspirations. 
This characterization applies with equal force to the law of the 
international system.  International law consists of the predictive rules 
and norms that govern the conduct of states and international organi-
zations.20  As elaborated further below, this law evolves out of recur-
rent interactions between the system’s actors and sustains the various 
normative rubrics of world politics: order, justice, prosperity, etc. 
 
 17. E.g., CARR, supra note 4, at 228–29 (arguing that international law was a function of 
the international power politics between “[t]he tiny number of states forming the international 
community” at that time); Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 1, at 641 (“In both the traditional 
and new varieties, CIL as an independent normative force has little if any effect on national be-
havior.”); HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 216–19 (1948) (“The difficulty 
of substituting the unanimous consent of all subjects of international law for genuine interna-
tional legislation becomes still more acute when states try to conclude general treaties dealing 
with political matters with binding effect for all or virtually all subjects of international law.”). 
 18. See KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1 (1979).  There cer-
tainly are notions of law, and international law in particular, that conceive the law as an end in 
itself or an immutable code of universal maxims with no necessary connection to practical con-
sequence.  While such conceptions may be interesting to the moralist or theologian, they are of 
little use in understanding, predicting, and channeling political action, which is, I believe, the 
common ambition of political science and the legal profession. 
 19. See generally Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 
(1897) (“The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the pub-
lic force through the instrumentality of the courts.”). 
 20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 101 (1987) (“Interna-
tional law, as used in this Restatement, consists of rules and principles of general application 
dealing with the conduct of states and of international organizations and with their relations in-
ter se, as well as with some of their relations with persons, whether natural or juridical.”) [here-
inafter RESTATEMENT 3D].  This concept is sometimes referred to in the legal academy as “pub-
lic international law.” 
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In his seminal work, The Concept of Law, H. L. A. Hart distin-
guishes between two types of legal rules: “primary” rules that govern 
social behavior and “secondary” rules that specify ways in which pri-
mary rules may be ascertained, eliminated, varied, or adjudicated.21  
In primitive legal societies, secondary rules tend to be poorly articu-
lated.  Thus, there is no recognized procedure for resolving disputes 
regarding the proper content or evolution of the law.  This condition 
results in several problematic effects: the legal process becomes static, 
uncertain, and inefficient.22 
These characteristics are precisely descriptive of the ailments af-
flicting contemporary international law.  Article 38 of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice articulates the sources generally ac-
cepted by international lawyers as the secondary rules of interna-
tional law: explicit international agreements, or treaties; customary 
international law (CIL); the general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations; and judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists.23 
CIL is conventionally understood as the product of consistent 
state practice and opinio juris, or a state’s subjective feeling of legal 
obligation to engage in a certain pattern of behavior.24  Since CIL is 
conceptually contingent on the behavior and beliefs of states, it ex-
presses the “naturally-evolving” law of international society.  Treaties 
express law that parties mutually consent to through explicit transac-
tions between them: a type of public international contract.  The 
“general principles of law” are norms that are theoretically common 
to all national legal systems.25  The “opinions of publicists” has been 
construed to include the classic works of the international legal 
 
 21. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89–96 (1961). 
 22. See id. at 90–94. 
 23. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 
3 Bevans 1153, 1187. 
 24. See Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 
31–32 (1974–75); Michael Byers, Introduction: Power, Obligation, and Customary International 
Law, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 81, 83 (2001); North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; 
F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb. 20) (“[acts constituting opinio juris] must also be such, 
or carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory 
by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. . . . The states concerned must therefore feel that 
they are conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation.  The frequency or even habitual 
character of the acts is not in itself enough.”); see also CLIVE PARRY, THE SOURCES AND 
EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965) (discussing the articulation and evolution of CIL).   
 25. RESTATEMENT 3D, supra note 20, § 102 cmt. l.  An example might be the law of con-
spiracy or of an elementary notion of remedy for civil wrongs.  Obviously, it is a great deal more 
difficult to derive norms from this principle in the postmodern, multicultural present than it 
would have been in pre-decolonization 1948, when the rule was drafted. 
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canon, such as Grotius and Vattel; the adjudication of contemporary 
national and international jurists; treatises and writings of authors of 
standing; resolutions of scholarly bodies such as the Institute of Inter-
national Law and the International Law Association; and draft texts 
and reports of the International Law Commission.26  In practice, the 
first two categories, CIL and treaties, are typically considered the 
primary sources of international law.27  The general principles and 
publicists’ opinions are relied upon as supporting principles which 
provide context for the primary sources.28 
While the Article 38 paradigm is an adequate framework for post 
hoc adjudication of most disputes, it is methodologically flawed as an 
articulation of the secondary rules of international law.  The problem 
is that it essentially relies on the behavior of states and what states say 
about their behavior as the basis for predicting change and continuity 
in the law’s primary rules.  In other words, it purports to assess and 
explain the causes of behavior with doctrinal descriptions of the same 
behavior.  Most international legal scholarship thus fails to distinguish 
between the causal sources of law and what amounts to evidence of 
that law.29 
The defects of this tautology can be seen in international law’s 
interminable doctrinal contention.  These tensions are particularly 
pronounced in the context of CIL.30  Conceptually, there is very little 
consensus regarding the contents of CIL’s constituent elements.  State 
practice is generally taken to include diplomatic and governmental 
acts interpreted in light of official statements of policy, whether taken 
unilaterally, or as part of an international organization.31  Some com-
mentators contend, in contrast, that state practice should be evalu-
ated independently of statements by actors regarding the justification 
or intent of their actions.32  By this definition it is quite difficult to 
 
 26. Id. § 103 reporters’ note 1. 
 27. See John King Gamble, Jr., The Treaty/Custom Dichotomy, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: 
CLASSIC AND CONTEMPORARY READINGS, supra note 2, at 75 (“But academics seldom think 
seriously about what the two principal sources, treaty and custom, mean, how they relate to 
each other, and how they have clouded or distorted our view of the field.”). 
 28. See RESTATEMENT 3D, supra note 20, § 102 reporters’ note 7. 
 29. An analogy in the domestic context would be trying to discern the legal speed limit by 
observing the speed of cars driven on the road. 
 30. Commentators frequently refer to these doctrinal tensions as either the paradox or co-
nundrum of CIL.  Cf. Swaine, supra note 14, at 563. 
 31. See RESTATEMENT 3D, supra note 20, § 102 cmt. b. 
 32. See, e.g., ANTHONY A. D’AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 34–39 (1971) [hereinafter CONCEPT OF CUSTOM]. 
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identify a place for opinio juris at all.  The converse option, however, 
permits states’ rationalization of their activities to have a formal law-
channeling effect unsubstantiated by political reality.33  Another prob-
lem with CIL identification is that it is not clear how consistently and 
how long a practice must continue before a legal norm is established 
or altered. 
There are further tensions with the systemic aspects of modern 
CIL.  International law emerged from the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries with a strong positivist character.34  Legal norms are 
generally thought to require state acquiescence both for efficacy and 
legitimacy.  This principle is given effect through a doctrine of sover-
eign self-exemption from emerging rules through specific dissenting 
acts during CIL norm formation.  This “persistent objector” rule, 
however, is becoming increasingly contested as some publicists and 
states assert that CIL norms created by a majority consensus are 
binding upon the entire community.35  It is also unclear how CIL can 
change, since any derogation from existing rules is formally illegal.36 
Treaties and conventions themselves constitute state practice and 
thus contribute to the development of CIL.37  In recent decades inter-
 
 33. See Akehurst, supra note 24, at 36–37 (arguing that states’ statements regarding inter-
national law should be considered opinio juris without reference to those states’ actions or ac-
tual beliefs). 
 34. See John A. Perkins, The Changing Foundations of International Law: From State Con-
sent to State Responsibility, 15 B.U. INT’L L.J. 433, 437 & n.6 (1997) (noting the roots of the 
twentieth century concept of law as arising only from an act of sovereignty—as articulated by 
the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Lotus case—in the writings of nineteenth 
century postivists—such as John Austin—but also observing that this view “continues to reso-
nate in the understanding of a public unacquainted with the writings of those often character-
ized as positivists or with the nature of the debates between postivists and others”). 
 35. See generally Gennady M. Danilenko, International Jus Cogens: Issues of Law-Making, 
2 EUR. J. INT’L L. 42 (1991), available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol2/No1/art3.html (last vis-
ited November 17, 2003) (discussing at length various publicists’ opposition to positivist law in 
the context of jus cogens formation). 
 36. See CONCEPT OF CUSTOM, supra note 32, at 4–5.  Hart also describes this reality: “The 
only mode of change in the rules known to such a society will be the slow process of growth, 
whereby courses of conduct once thought optional become first habitual or usual, and then 
obligatory, and the converse process of decay, when deviations, once severely dealt with, are 
first tolerated and then pass unnoticed.”  HART, supra note 21, at 90. 
 37. See Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13, 29–30 (June 3) (“[M]ultilateral 
conventions may have an important role to play in recording and defining rules deriving from 
custom, or indeed in developing them.”).  But see R.R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 
RECUEIL DES COURS 25, 96 (1970) (“The phenomenon of the crowding out of customary inter-
national law by treaties to which a substantial number of States have become parties has already 
been alluded to.  The price of success is to limit the scope for the operation of customary law, so 
that as more and more States become parties it is virtually impossible to say what the law would 
be in the absence of the treaty. . . . And if little or no customary international practice is gener-
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national legal advocates have attempted to overcome some of the in-
determinacy associated with CIL by codifying substantive areas 
through multilateral binding agreements.38  This initiative, however, 
has proven to have only moderate efficacy.  In most cases, resolution 
of disputes regarding a treaty’s terms must finally be effected by the 
contesting parties themselves.39  Further, a treaty’s contents are them-
selves subject to reconstruction through the medium of CIL.40  Thus, 
the same tension that characterized discussion of CIL ultimately in-
fects any contested ground in the treaty context as well. 
This cumulative doctrinal indeterminacy is exemplified in the re-
cent emergence of jus cogens, or purported peremptory norms of in-
ternational law from which there can be no legal derogation.41  Jus co-
gens has a solid grounding in the legal literature.42  There is no 
consensus, however, as to what constitutes a peremptory norm or how 
a given norm rises to that level.43  Conventionally asserted jus cogens 
principles include prohibitions on genocide, slavery, aggressive use of 
 
ated by the non-parties, it becomes virtually impossible to determine whether the treaty has in-
deed passed into customary international law.”) (footnote omitted). 
 38. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical 
Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 81, 155 n.238 (2001) (lamenting the 
resistance of states to efforts by publicists to codify international criminal law). 
 39. There are adjudicative bodies available, but the decision to abide by their rulings 
remains a sovereign one.  The International Court of Justice’s decision in the Nicaragua Case, 
for example, was ignored by the United States.  Discontinuance by Nicaragua in Case Against 
the United States, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 173 (1992) (citing the “longstanding” view by the United 
States that the I.C.J. was “without jurisdiction to entertain the dispute”). 
 40. Cf. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 103 (June 27) 
(recognizing that CIL has defined the substantive contents of the sparse use of force language 
contained in the UN Charter) [hereinafter Nicaragua Case]; RESTATEMENT 3D, supra note 20, § 
102 cmt. j (“A new rule of customary law will supersede inconsistent obligations created by ear-
lier agreement if the parties so intend and the intention is clearly manifested.”). 
 41. RESTATEMENT 3D, supra note 20, § 102 cmt. k.  The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties defines jus cogens as peremptory norms from which there can be no derogation.  The 
norms’ relatively recent origin is asserted in articles 53 and 64 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 53, 64, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 344, 347 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 42. Article 53 of the Vienna Convention, supra note 41, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344, states: 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of 
general international law.  For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory 
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the interna-
tional community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permit-
ted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law 
having the same character. 
In the Nicaragua Case, the International Court of Justice suggests jus cogens as a fundamental 
principle of international law.  Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.C.J. at 100. 
 43. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes, Jus Cogens, and Obligatio Erga Omnes, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1996, at 63, 67. 
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force, and piracy.44  Claims have also been made, however, for such 
principles as a people’s permanent sovereignty over wealth and natu-
ral resources, the right to development, space and the seabed as the 
common heritage of mankind, and a people’s right to a cultural heri-
tage.45  Some scholars see jus cogens sources and customary interna-
tional law as the same, others distinguish between them, while still 
others contend that jus cogens is simply another way of describing 
certain “general principles of law.”46  Thus, the legal rationale for jus 
cogens amounts to a sort of tautology: all states are obligated to abide 
by jus cogens norms because they are universal; and they are univer-
sal because all states are expected to abide by them. 
Hart’s obvious prescription for this legal quagmire is clear dis-
tinction of secondary rules.  In a well-ordered domestic society, these 
rules are manifested in the function of legal institutions exercising 
some combination of executive, legislative, and judicial powers dis-
tinct from, and determinative of, the primary rules that define legally 
acceptable social behavior.  The international environment, however, 
is notoriously resistant to thorough-going institutionalization.  States 
resist such formal articulation of secondary rules precisely because 
they seek to retain their freedom of action.  Thus, any state action is a 
potential proposal for modification of the existing regime (legisla-
tive), a potential enforcement of established law (executive), and a 
potential judicial determination upholding or applying existing law to 
facts (judicial).  The international community’s reaction to a state act 
has a similar potential for overlap. 
Consequently, formalist analysis of international law’s secondary 
rules is unlikely to yield determinable predictive results.  It inevitably 
becomes bogged down in normative contestation and doctrinal ambi-
guity.  The alternate approach taken here is to develop a functional 
theory of international law’s secondary rules. 
The theory’s basic premise is that international law’s primary be-
havioral rules are the product of a strategic process of norm coordina-
tion, recognition, and collective conditioning.  The theory predicts 
that the content of these legal rules (the dependent variable) will be-
come contested when there is a change in the complex strategic envi-
ronment encountered by international actors (the independent vari-
able).  If this change is sufficiently thorough and persistent, the new 
 
 44. See id. at 68. 
 45. See Danilenko, supra note 35, at 42–43, 57–64. 
 46. Id. 
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rule will ultimately gain community legitimacy and recognition as a 
new or amended principle of international law.  Where such a legal 
rule is supported by overwhelming sustaining conditions there is some 
basis to assert it as a jus cogens norm. 
II.  THE STRATEGIC EQUATION 
This section articulates this functional theory’s three explanatory 
variables: capabilities, information, and values.  The variables are de-
rived from contrasting IR paradigms of how international actors 
make decisions in the world environment.  Rather than trying to re-
solve whether any one perspective is predictively superior to the oth-
ers, the model constructed here assumes that they each provide a 
valuable, distinctive insight into the complex reality of world politics.  
The resultant theory consequently incorporates an explanatory vari-
able from each.47  Once in operation, the theory should provide a suf-
ficiently sophisticated—yet reasonably parsimonious—model of 
world politics to understand the formation, function, and evolution of 
international law. 48 
A. Capabilities (Independent Variable) 
As alluded to before, the realist paradigm is not generally con-
sidered amenable to international law.  It provides, however, invalu-
able insights into the structure of the international system and, there-
fore, the environment within which the law operates.  Classical 
realism conceptualizes the political realm as a struggle for domina-
tion.49  It is a sort of political Nietzscheism: actors are primally (and 
therefore properly) motivated by the will to acquire and employ 
power. 
Power is itself a theoretically problematic term, sharing in some 
of the same kind of conceptual ambiguity and imprecise use experi-
enced by international law.  “Power can be thought of as the ability of 
an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do 
 
 47. One possible expression for this conception of the strategic environment is: (Capabili-
ties • Information • Values) = (Complex Strategic Environment). 
 48. The claim here is not that the three variables articulated here are the only causal fac-
tors in world politics, but that they afford an adequate explanatory basis for the present project.  
It is certainly conceivable, indeed likely, that a great many more, or more precisely calibrated 
variables would inform our analysis.  This theory is based on these three because there exists a 
comprehensive literature articulating their general form, they generally comport with Kenneth 
Waltz’s structure (which will serve as the foundational concept), and for the fact that one must 
pick a finite number of cases or lose all predictive traction. 
 49. Thinkers in this vein include CARR, supra note 4, and MORGENTHAU, supra note 17. 
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(and at an acceptable cost to the actor).”50  A more general articula-
tion is “power is the ability to do.”51  Such broad definitions, however, 
conflate a spectrum of discrete issues which must be distinguished for 
the modeling project: they draw on images based on both resources 
and perceptions between the actors.  The latter image in particular 
implicates prestige, reputation, and ultimately, an actor’s beliefs.  In 
order to increase specificity, contemporary realists often employ the 
more precise term “capability,” by which they mean to focus analysis 
on quantifiable (and therefore comparable) means of political coer-
cion.  Thus, the central explanatory variable in the realist paradigm 
developed here is the relative capabilities of the actors engaged in any 
particular interaction.52 
Capabilities may be manipulated to achieve different systemic ef-
fects.53  In addition to variable distribution, capability itself varies 
among issue areas as well.  Different capability types, in other words, 
are not perfectly fungible.54  Thus, some resources or actors that are 
quite effective in achieving results in a particular strategic situation 
may be of marginal, or even negative, utility in another. 
Kenneth Waltz famously developed this capability focus into an 
elegant model of international order.  His “structural realist” para-
digm is characterized by functionally identical, egoistic units (states) 
interacting under conditions of anarchy.55  The only structurally sig-
nificant distinction among these units is an inequitable distribution of 
capabilities.  In order to achieve their goals, states tend to behave in a 
manner that will maximize their relative capabilities.  They must do 
so, however, in an inter-actor, or strategic, environment, where all the 
other units are trying to do substantially the same thing and capabili-
ties are finite.  Thus, the structure of the international system essen-
 
 50. ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD 
POLITICS IN TRANSITION 11 (1977). 
 51. O’CONNOR, supra note 11, at 194. 
 52. I do not mean to assert that no realists are concerned with prestige or actor beliefs.  
Thucydides, Machiavelli, Carr, and Morgenthau (classical realists) were each very interested in 
such inquiry.  See, e.g., CARR, supra note 4, at 168–215 (discussing the impact of public opinion 
and public morals on state behavior).  The structural realist paradigm developed here, however, 
definitely tends to discount such complex variables in favor of the elegance of relative capabili-
ties. 
 53. Krasner articulates these effects as the ability to dictate the rules of the strategic game 
(such as who can move first), to dictate the payoffs associated with various possible moves, and 
to determine who can play the game in the first place.  See Stephen D. Krasner, Global Com-
munications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier, 43 WORLD POL. 336, 340 (1991). 
 54. See KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 50, at 11. 
 55. See WALTZ, supra note 18, at 79–101 (articulating a structural model of world politics). 
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tially causes states to become rational actors in a strategic market 
where capabilities are the imperfectly fungible currency of trade. 
The operation of this market converts the classical realists’ “war 
of all against all” into a modus vivendi–seeking balance of power.  
States adapt their egoistic goals into a hierarchy of strategic prefer-
ences.56  They engage in “satisficing” behavior, trying to allocate ca-
pabilities and exploit disparities to influence other actors in ways 
which maximize the achievement of their own strategically contingent 
preferences.  The most capable system actors provide the indispensa-
ble fulcrum for this interaction. 
Since legal rules depend on some measure of compliance, they 
must be sustained, or at least acquiesced in, by actors exercising a 
preponderance of strategic capability.  The key prediction of the ca-
pability variable is that where there is a change in capability distribu-
tion, particularly among the most capable actors, there will be 
changes in strategic behavior that potentially affects the content of in-
ternational law.57 
This paper will operationalize capabilities as a resource-focused 
variable.  In particular, it will focus on such standard realist indices as 
relative, issue-area relevant economic, military, and political potency.  
Where there is indication of significant shifts in the preponderance of 
strategic resources available to major system actors whose strategy 
potentially run counter to an existing legal norm, we will expect to see 
change. 
B. Information (Independent Variable) 
The information variable is based on the insight that what inter-
national actors know (or do not know) about their counterparts’ ca-
pabilities and future behavior is at least equally important to strategic 
decision as the capabilities themselves.  This places information at a 
 
 56. See Jeffrey A. Frieden, Actors and Preferences in International Relations, in STRATEGIC 
CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 39, 41–45 (David A. Lake & Robert Powell eds., 
1999). 
 57. Realists predict that capability shifts are the sole substantive determinant of behavior.  
Thus, norms are incidental by-products of the balance of power and are subject to arbitrary al-
teration as soon as the capability relationship changes.  The frequent failure of this prediction, 
particularly in regards to coordinative issue areas such as trade and money, is what led to chal-
lenges to structural realism from within the discipline of International Relations.  See ROBERT 
O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD OF 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 7–10 (1984) (describing the predictive failures of realism in the post–
World War II era). 
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high premium.  The information variable is principally derived from 
the institutionalist paradigm. 
Institutionalism addresses itself to political interaction that is 
anomalous to realism, such as international organizations and behav-
ioral norms and it largely adopts structural realist assumptions re-
garding the operation of the strategic structure.  Where structural re-
alism is preoccupied with the distribution of capabilities alone, 
however, institutionalism focuses on the choices available to states 
confronting strategic dilemmas.  Institutionalism points out that in 
many scenarios, the most effective strategy is more dependent on the 
anticipated moves and reactions of other actors than the precise dis-
tribution of their capabilities. 
A standard illustrative metaphor for conceptualizing this interac-
tion is game theory.58  Here, bilateral strategic dilemmas are modeled 
as a choice/payoff matrix.  The distribution of payoffs for different 
moves determines the structure of the game—for example, “chicken,” 
“prisoner’s dilemma,” and “battle of the sexes.”  The values assigned 
to available moves reflect the capabilities of the actors involved, and 
in some situations may change the structure of the game.  Within a 
general spectrum, however, the anticipated move of a strategic coun-
terpart is more significant than a particular capability value.  While 
states’ preferences never exactly coincide, there is almost inevitably 
some margin of overlap.59  Each state’s “best” move (its value maxi-
mizing/rational one) is contingent on its expectation of other states’ 
behavior.60  Thus, contrary to the antagonistic relationship predicted 
by realism, rational actors engaged in repeated strategic interactions 
discover that they can obtain superior results in most situations by 
 
 58. For a general discussion of game theory, see JAMES D. MORROW, GAME THEORY FOR 
POLITICAL SCIENTISTS (1994).  See also Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Cus-
tomary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999) (applying game theory to CIL—albeit 
with a decided instrumentalist/realist orientation). 
 59. In those situations where there is no overlap of interests there is no possibility for coor-
dination, and hence no function for institutions.  In reality, however, such situations are excep-
tionally rare (an example might be the World War II insistence of the Allies on absolute victory 
vis-à-vis the Axis Powers).  Even where competing strategic actors are engaged in a “dividing-
the-finite-pie” relationship, they will usually benefit from Pareto-maximizing information that 
permits them to both avoid unwanted conflict but still fully exploit the contested good.  See 
THOMAS C. SCHELLING, STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 58–67 (1963) (describing coordination in 
“zero-sum” situations). 
 60. See id. at 15. 
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coordinating their actions.61  Keohane and Nye describe the resulting 
bargaining behavior as process.62 
Information about other actors’ past, and thus, anticipated future 
behavior is critical to the strategic process.  The international system, 
however, is characterized by imperfect information—actors cannot 
perfectly predict other actors’ preferences, capabilities, or behavior.  
As discussed above, a state will attempt to influence the behavior of 
other actors in order to maximize its own benefits.63  States often have 
an incentive to misrepresent the extent of their commitments in order 
to gain strategic advantage. 64  Thus, the strategic process is character-
ized by problems of credibility. 
Another by-product of strategic interaction in an imperfect in-
formational process is the very real likelihood of sub-optimal out-
comes.  Since states often misrepresent their commitments and gain 
advantages from periodic defection, it is quite difficult for strategic 
partners to consistently reach preference equilibria that are Pareto-
efficient.65  Instead, they frequently settle on consensus points that are 
defined more by their mutual cognitive appearance than their contri-
bution to utility.66 
As rational actors engaged in an ongoing strategic game, states 
have incentives to remedy these market inefficiencies.  Consequently, 
they devise functional apparatuses to facilitate access to strategic in-
formation and coordinate their behavior.  Sub- and suprastate inter-
ests also have incentives to participate in this process by providing in-
formation responsive to their own strategic objectives.  The resulting 
Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGOs), Non-Governmental Or-
ganizations (NGOs), and associated coordinating rules of behavior 
shape the strategic process, playing a key information-utility role.  
Consistent participation in such informational activities consolidates 
an actor’s credibility and increases the availability of strategic infor-
mation regarding other actors.  This predictability considerably re-
duces the negotiation and uncertainty costs of international politics 
and facilitates each state’s ability to achieve and sustain its social 
 
 61. See id.; KEOHANE, supra note 57, at 52–54, 75–78. 
 62. KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 50, at 20–21 (1977). 
 63. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 64. See SCHELLING, supra note 59, at 35–36 (discussing the problem of demonstrating 
commitment to fulfill threats that are counter to an actor’s interest, such as massive retaliation). 
 65. See KEOHANE, supra note 57, at 85–98 (discussing the problem of strategic market fail-
ure). 
 66. SCHELLING, supra note 59, at 72–73. 
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preferences.67  Information-enhancing rules and organizations conse-
quently provide the principal substantive content of international law. 
This paper will operationalize information through the formation 
of NGOs and IGOs as well as the focus of protracted media attention 
to a particular issue area.  Where there is a change in the availability, 
credibility, or substance of information relating to a particular issue 
area, we will expect to see a change in the associated law. 
C. Strategic Values (Independent Variable) 
The capabilities and information variables developed above both 
rest on essentially rationalist, unitary actor assumptions regarding the 
nature of the primary system actors, states.68  Under this rubric, states 
are theorized with uniform preferences (capability-maximization) and 
react to strategic situations in cognitively identical ways.  In contrast, 
the strategic values variable attempts to account for the complex real-
ity of world politics.  It is grounded in a spectrum of “post-rationalist” 
studies, which query the identity and cognitive processes of interna-
tional actors.  These studies acknowledge an array of diverse, compet-
ing interests, experiences, and elites within political units (Liberal-
ism);69 the complex interaction of these diverse actors across political 
units (Complex Interdependence);70 and the conditioning effect of 
these interactions on actors’ cognition of the strategic environment 
(Constructivism).71 
Strategic values are concerned with conditioned perceptions, ex-
pectations, and path dependencies that affect the way that decision-
makers comprehend the international environment, and thus con-
strain strategic choice.  Observed phenomena associated with strate-
gic values include norm “stickiness,” special affinities (or antago-
nisms) between particular international actors, and peculiar 
institutional decision processes.  Of particular relevance to the inter-
 
 67. KEOHANE, supra note 57, at 97; HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A 
STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS 4–6 (1977) (“The order which men look for in social life 
is not any pattern or regularity in the relations of individuals or groups, but a pattern that leads 
to a particular result, an arrangement of social life such that it promotes certain goals or val-
ues.”). 
 68. Information’s acknowledgment of space for nongovernmental actors is an acknowl-
edged qualification for this generalization. 
 69. See, e.g., Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of Inter-
national Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513 (1997). 
 70. See, e.g., KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 50, at 24–37. 
 71. See, e.g., Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State, 88 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 384 (1994). 
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national legal context is the conditioned reliance on informational 
rules and institutions to base expectations regarding other actors’ de-
fault, or appropriate, conduct.  Another macro effect of strategic val-
ues is to bind the strategic “free market” of anarchy into a more pol-
yarchic structure. 
This paper will operationalize strategic values through domestic 
institutional change and observed social value shifts.  Where such 
path dependencies are relevant to a particular rule change, we will 
expect to see a change in international law. 
III.  PRIMARY INTERNATIONAL RULES (DEPENDENT VARIABLE) 
The dependent variable is the substantive behavioral rules of in-
ternational law.  As discussed above,72 Article 38 of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice articulates the generally accepted basis 
for determining the content of international law.  That rubric will es-
sentially be adopted here as the basis for identifying observable mani-
festations of the dependent variable.  Thus, evidence of continuity or 
change in the law will include the following: specific state actions or 
inaction reflecting state practice; policy statements and state digests 
reflecting opinio juris; patterns of treaty adoption, provisions, and ad-
herence or defection; international and national judicial decisions re-
flecting general principles of law; and, to a lesser extent, commentary 
by legal publicists.73 
IV.  THE CASES 
This section will apply the theory developed above in the context 
of three purported rules: the international legal prohibitions on slav-
ery, foreign intervention, and landmines.  The cases were selected to 
evaluate the theory’s validity across a reasonably diverse cross-section 
of substantive international issue areas.  The three rules are also rep-
resentative of three broader international regimes that comprise a 
significant portion of the total spectrum of world politics.  The pro-
scription on slavery is perhaps the original rule of the modern inter-
national human rights regime.  The prohibition on intervention in the 
territorial domain and affairs of another state is one of the founda-
tional rules of the sovereignty regime, and therefore of international 
law.  The landmine ban derives from the armed conflict regime.  The 
 
 72. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 73. A possible expression of this dependent variable is: (International Law) = (state prac-
tice + opinio juris + treaties + publicists’ opinion). 
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cases are limited to consideration of prohibitionary rules in order to 
provide some level of standardization and to minimize ambiguity re-
lated to affirmative normative duties.  The cases are also limited to 
primary (behavioral) rules to limit causal tautology problems.74  To-
gether, they comprise a non-exhaustive, comparative basis for assess-
ing the utility of the functional theory of international legal continuity 
and change developed in this paper. 
A. Slavery 
Slavery has existed for time immemorial.  The practice was 
common among the Greeks and Romans, and was considered a natu-
ral condition by Aristotle.75  Almost every other world civilization has 
had a functional equivalent.  The contemporary legal prohibition on 
slavery, however, originated as a function of the early modern era ef-
fort to end the transatlantic slave trade.76  This unambiguously brutal 
commerce transported millions of African people to the Americas 
principally to perform agricultural labor.  Until the late eighteenth 
century, this practice generally went unchallenged.77  Hugo Grotius, 
for example, wrote in 1646 that slavery was a feature of positive law.78  
The humanist ideas of the European Enlightenment, however, began 
to change social and political attitudes towards slavery.  Protestant 
Christian revivalism, spurred by the spread of printed gospels to an 
increasingly literate population, also provided a powerful impetus for 
abolitionism.79 
Due to a number of congruent economic, political, and cultural 
conditions,80 this ideational revolution was particularly powerful in 
 
 74. The non-intervention norm is intimately related to the law of sovereignty and interna-
tional legal personality.  See Stephen D. Krasner, Problematic Sovereignty, in PROBLEMATIC 
SOVEREIGNTY 1, 5–12 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 2001) (conceptualizing different aspects of the 
state sovereignty norm; Krasner’s “Westphalian Sovereignty” is equivalent to the concept of 
non-intervention developed here).  This paper, however, will limit itself, to the extent possible, 
to the prohibition on intervention in another state’s physical territory. 
 75. Anti-Slavery International, The History of Anti-Slavery International, at http://www. 
antislavery.org/homepage/antislavery/history.pdf (last visited November 16, 2003). 
 76. See id. 
 77. See Renee Colette Redman, The League of Nations and the Right to be Free from En-
slavement: The First Human Right to be Recognized as Customary International Law, 70 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 759, 765–68 (1994). 
 78. See id. at 766–67. 
 79. See Anti-Slavery International, supra note 75. 
 80. These included, inter alia, Britain’s dominant commercial position, lead in the nascent 
industrial revolution, eclectic mix of potent evangelical religious denominations, and relatively 
pluralistic political institutions.  See generally J.R. OLDFIELD, POPULAR POLITICS AND BRITISH 
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Britain.  Slavery was not widely practiced in Britain itself, no doubt 
largely due to the surplus and political power of free labor.  Thus, an 
abolitionist cultural norm emerged relatively unchecked in Britain it-
self.  Slavery was declared illegal in England in 1772 and in Scotland 
in 1778, but it persisted in the colonies, where the practice was re-
garded as economically imperative.81 
The Quakers were the initial force to actively seek to proscribe 
the international slave trade.  During the 1770s the Society of Friends 
purged its membership of slave traders and owners.82  In 1783, Phila-
delphia and London-based Quaker groups acted in concert to estab-
lish the first modern-era international abolitionist organization, the 
Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade.83  This organization and 
its successors served as a vehicle for the collection and public distribu-
tion of extensive first-hand information on conditions relating to the 
international slave trade.84 
These organizational efforts bore fruit in 1807 when both the 
United States and Britain prohibited international slave trafficking.85  
Coincidentally, Britain had just emerged victorious from the Napole-
onic wars and now had both the incentive and the preponderant ca-
pabilities sufficient to attempt to control the Africa trade.86  Aboli-
tionism provided a utilitarian vehicle for this hegemonic endeavor.  
The British began active naval patrols to prevent slaves from leaving 
Africa and put pressure on other European, African, and American 
governments to curtail the commerce as well.87  These efforts achieved 
some notable formal successes.  France proscribed slave trading in 
1815.88  At the Congresses of Paris (1814), Vienna (1815), and Verona 
(1822), the key powers of Europe jointly pledged to suppress the 
slave trade.89 
 
ANTI-SLAVERY: THE MOBILISATION OF PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST THE SLAVE TRADE 7–33 
(1995); A.G. Hopkins, The “New International Economic Order” in the Nineteenth Century: 
Britain’s First Development Plan for Africa, in FROM SLAVE TRADE TO “LEGITIMATE” 
COMMERCE: THE COMMERCIAL TRANSITION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY WEST AFRICA 240–59 
(Robin Law ed., 1995) [hereinafter “LEGITIMATE” COMMERCE]. 
 81. See Anti-Slavery International, supra note 75. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See id. 
 84. See OLDFIELD, supra note 80, at 41–64 (discussing the Society for the Abolition of 
Slavery generally and its London Committee in particular). 
 85. Redman, supra note 77, at 768. 
 86. See Hopkins, supra note 80, at 246. 
 87. See Redman, supra note 77, at 772. 
 88. See id. at 769. 
 89. See id. at 769–70. 
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This formal consensus did not translate, however, into a substan-
tive international legal prohibition.  The slave-holding planter socie-
ties of the Americas and their European patrons continued to com-
prise a strong international constituency opposed to abolition.  In 
1825, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court ordered the return of 
slaves discovered on a captured pirate ship to their original Spanish 
owners, finding the recent national prohibitions of the slave trade in-
sufficient grounds to change positive international law established by 
two centuries of uniform slave trading practice.90  Contemporary Brit-
ish cases were in accord.91  Thus, British cruisers did not search for-
eign-flagged vessels and the slave commerce continued apace.92 
Britain, however, sustained its abolitionist policy.  It pressured a 
significant number of states into bilateral treaties granting mutual 
rights for each state to search ships flying the other’s flag.93  In 1833, 
Parliament formally abolished slavery throughout the Empire.94  In 
1841, it initiated a multilateral treaty proclaiming the slave trade an 
act of piracy.95  Britain also attempted to cut off the supply of slaves at 
its source, intervening directly in African societies to depose rulers 
that persisted in the commerce.96  Despite these efforts, however, the 
transatlantic slave trade remained robust until the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, when the demand for slaves was terminated in 
the Americas as a result of the American Civil War (and resulting 
revolutionary domestic institutional change) as well as continuing 
British pressure on Brazil and Cuba.97  These events signaled the po-
litical and cultural unification of the contemporary world powers 
around an abolitionist norm. 
Subsequent to the cessation of the transatlantic slave trade, abo-
litionist efforts shifted in focus to the continuing practice of slavery in 
the Middle East and Africa itself.  In 1885, the European powers held 
a meeting in Berlin to coordinate their African colonial policies.98  
 
 90. See Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 90 (1825). 
 91. See Redman, supra note 77, at 771. 
 92. See id. at 772. 
 93. See id. at 772–73. 
 94. See id. at 768. 
 95. Redman, supra note 77, at 773; Treaty for the Suppression of the African Slave Trade, 
Dec. 20, 1841, 92 Consol. T.S. 437 [hereinafter Treaty of London]. 
 96. See Kristin Mann, Owners, Slaves and the Struggle for Labour in the Commercial Tran-
sition at Lagos, in “LEGITIMATE” COMMERCE, supra note 80, at 144, 145 (citing the British in-
tervention in Lagos in 1851 to depose a holdout to an abolition treaty). 
 97. See Redman, supra note 77, at 773–75 n.88–92. 
 98. See id. at 775. 
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While the central concern of the Berlin Conference was establishing a 
free trade area in central Africa, the resulting General Act also pro-
vided that “[c]onformably to the principles of the law of nations . . . 
the territories forming the conventional basin of the Congo . . . shall 
not serve either for a market or way of transit for the trade in slaves 
of any race whatever.”99  Four years later, the British initiated a simi-
lar conference at Brussels with the purpose of ending “the crimes and 
devastation engendered by the traffic in African slaves.”100  The con-
vention resulting from this meeting provided for economic and mili-
tary measures to directly intervene in the slave trade within Africa as 
well as a comprehensive system of maritime search rights for vessels 
in the area.101  Indeed, enforcement of the emergent international rule 
prohibiting slavery served as both rationale and impetus for the ex-
tension of European colonial control over Africa.102 
Following World War I, the Allied powers reaffirmed their 
commitment to the legal elimination of slavery in the Treaty of St. 
Germain-en-Laye.103  In 1922, the League of Nations requested that 
its member nations report on the status of their efforts to eliminate 
slavery.104  Receiving disappointing replies, the League Council estab-
lished a Temporary Slavery Commission to collect information and 
make recommendations to facilitate elimination of the practice.105  
The Temporary Slavery Commission’s report led to the adoption of 
the Slavery Convention of 1926 by the League member states.106  This 
convention was the first international agreement to define the terms 
“slavery” and the “slave trade” in international law.  According to the 
Slavery Convention, slavery is the “status or condition of a person 
 
 99. General Act of the Conference of Berlin Respecting the Congo, Feb. 26, 1885, art. 9, 
reprinted in 3 AM. J. INT’L L. 7, 13–14 (Supp. 1909). 
 100. General Act for the Repression of the African Slave Trade, July 2, 1890, pmbl., 27 Stat. 
886, 887, 1 Bevans 134, 135 [hereinafter Brussels Act]. 
 101. See Redman, supra note 77, at 775–76. 
 102. See Robin Law, Introduction, in “LEGITIMATE” COMMERCE, supra note 80, at 1, 23–25 
(discussing the policing of the slave trade and the growth of formal imperialism in Africa); see 
also Redman, supra note 77, at 774–76 (noting that the Brussels Act “provided for the estab-
lishment of military stations in the interior of Africa to prevent the capture of slaves, to provide 
for the interception of slave caravans, and to organize expeditions”). 
 103. Convention Revising the General Act of Berlin and the General Act and Declaration 
of Brussels, Sept. 10, 1919, 49 Stat. 3027, 8 L.N.T.S. 25 (entered into force Apr. 3, 1930) [herein-
after Convention of St. Germain-en-Laye]. 
 104. See Redman, supra note 77, at 777. 
 105. See Anti-Slavery International, supra note 75. 
 106. International Convention to Suppress Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 
2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 253 (entered into force Mar. 9, 1927) [hereinafter Slavery Convention of 
1926]. 
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over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of owner-
ship are exercised.”107  Significantly, this definition excludes several 
“slavery-like” practices, such as forced labor, which several of the 
original signatories deemed critical to the social stability of traditional 
societies.108  The slave trade includes “all acts involved in the capture, 
acquisition or disposal of a person with intent to reduce him to slav-
ery; all acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with a view to selling 
or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale or exchange of a slave 
acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged, and, in general, 
every act of trade or transport in slaves.”109  The Convention also im-
posed duties on signatories to “progressively” abolish slavery in all its 
forms and to prosecute offenders against the convention.110 
The League Council subsequently established a permanent Ad-
visory Committee of Experts on Slavery to monitor and distribute in-
formation on compliance with the Convention.111  In the succeeding 
years, the Committee’s reports and those reports’ linkage to financial 
assistance and gaining membership in the League itself were a cata-
lyst for the proscription of slavery in most of the remaining practitio-
ner states.112 
International efforts in regards to slavery both intensified and 
became more complex after the founding of the United Nations.  UN 
organizations have produced a steady stream of studies, surveys, and 
reports on slavery.113  For the duration of the Cold War, both blocs 
were also incentivized to employ their capabilities to achieve ideo-
logically-appealing abolitionist legal norms.114  These efforts facili-
tated the adoption of the Supplementary Convention on the Aboli-
tion of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar 
to Slavery in 1956.115  Adherence to this treaty,116 combined with the 
 
 107. Slavery Convention of 1926, supra note 106, art. 1, 46 Stat. at 2191, 60 L.N.T.S. at 263. 
 108. Redman, supra note 77, at 781. 
 109. Slavery Convention of 1926, supra note 106, art. 1, 46 Stat. at 2191, 60 L.N.T.S. at 263. 
 110. The abolition requirement was “progressive” due to concern of severe social and eco-
nomic upheaval in traditional societies if required immediately.  See Slavery Convention of 
1926, supra note 107, art. 2, 46 Stat. at 2191, 60 L.N.T.S. at 263. 
 111. See Redman, supra note 77, at 784–85. 
 112. See id. at 785–92. 
 113. See A. Yasmine Rassam, Contemporary Forms of Slavery and the Evolution of the Pro-
hibition of Slavery and the Slave Trade Under Customary International Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 
303, 329–42 (1999). 
 114. See Anti-Slavery International, supra note 75. 
 115. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institu-
tions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, 266 U.N.T.S. 40 (entered 
into force Apr. 30, 1957) [hereinafter Supplementary Convention of 1956]. 
091504 COOK.DOC 10/18/2004  9:55 AM 
2004] THE STRATEGIC CONTINGENCY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 111 
historical developments discussed above, a host of concurring interna-
tional and regional human rights instruments,117 the universal national 
legal abolition of slavery,118 language in significant judicial opinions,119 
and a stream of publicists’ endorsements120 comprise a substantial 
formal basis for the claim that the prohibition on slavery is a jus co-
gens principle of international law.121  This rule continues to be vigor-
ously monitored by the successor organizations to the original Com-
mittee on the Slave Trade.122 
Conversely, the very interest, information, and activity associated 
with this rule have undermined its apparent universality.  Human 
rights interests have attempted to expand the scope of the slavery 
prohibition to proscribe such “slavery-like” practices as sex traffick-
ing, forced labor, bonded labor, and immigrant domestic workers.123  
As these practices continue to be widely adhered to in many societies, 
their inclusion under the slavery rubric tends to dilute the rule’s clar-
ity.124  The legal image is further complicated by attempts by critical 
studies components of the legal academy to import such harms as 
 
 116. According to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 119 nations 
have ratified the Supplementary Convention of 1956, as of February 5, 2002.  See Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations Treaty Collection: Supplementary Con-
vention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to 
Slavery, at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty4.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2003). 
 117. These include Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, 
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, at 73, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); Article 8 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171, 175; Article 4 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224; Article 6 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 146, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 99, 
103 (1970); and Article 5 of the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
Ministerial Meeting, Organization of African Unity, June 27, 1981, O.A.U. Doc. 
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5, 21 I.L.M. 58, 60 (1982), available at http://www.africa-union.org/home/ 
Welcome.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2003). 
 118. Mauritania was the final state to formally proscribe institutional slavery in 1981.  See 
Rassam, supra note 113, at 322. 
 119. See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 
33–34 (Second Phase) (Judgment of Feb. 5). 
 120. See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 38, at 107–08, 112–15; Rassam, supra note 113, at 310. 
 121. Slavery and slave trading are also generally recognized as crimes of universal jurisdic-
tion.  See Bassiouni, supra note 38, at 107–08, 112–15; RESTATEMENT 3D, supra note 20, § 702, 
reporters’ note 4. 
 122. See Anti-Slavery International, supra note 75. 
 123. See id.; see also Rassam, supra note 113, at 322–29. 
 124. These efforts are demonstrative of the casuistry typically employed in any legal analy-
sis.  The established principles in the slavery context are extrapolated to similar humanitarian 
norms.  Consequently, the new norms are either legitimized, or the existing one is obfuscated, 
depending on the outcome of strategic process. 
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gender discrimination and exclusion from “the legal discourse” into 
the slavery proscription.125  Finally, the exposure of the continuing 
practice of vestigial slavery in Africa and the Middle East,126 coupled 
with the apparent incapacity of the international community to im-
pose effective sanctions, suggests that the efficacy of the prohibition 
on traditional forms of slavery may itself be in jeopardy.127 
This continuing contestation at the margins, however, does not 
necessarily undermine the core legal rule or its legitimacy.  States 
generally accept responsibility to at least prevent the kind of chattel 
slavery defined in the 1926 Convention and take affirmative actions 
to combat the most egregious violations.128  Moreover, it is virtually 
inconceivable that a permissive norm could supplant the slavery pro-
scription barring a catastrophic upheaval in the current international 
environment.  Consequently, the contemporary legal proscription of 
slavery and the slave trade presents a complex reality typical of inter-
national law, but is clearly a legitimate, functioning law nonetheless. 
B. Non-Intervention 
The modern prohibition on intervention in another state’s sover-
eignty emerged in Europe between the fourteenth and seventeenth 
centuries).129  The overlapping affiliations of that period (religion, 
family, language, territory, etc.) created conditions of virtually con-
tinuous civil strife.130  The early non-intervention norm reflected a 
 
 125. Rassam, supra note 113, at 345–49. 
 126. See id. at 321–22. 
 127. The verdict remains out on the availability and efficacy of international sanctions.  Po-
litical inertia and cultural sensitivity concerns have handicapped the ability of Western states to 
intervene directly to halt this trade as they might have done in the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury.  It may be, however, that international exposure and opprobrium will ultimately prove suf-
ficient sanctions to enforce the prohibition.  If that does prove to be the case, these identified 
violations would in fact substantiate the efficacy of the rule. 
 128. See, e.g., Walter H. Kansteiner, III, U.S. Policy Towards Sudan, Testimony Before the 
House Committee on International Relations (June 5, 2002) (Assistant Secretary of State for 
African Affairs outlines the need for Sudan to be “a priority in America’s foreign policy” to 
combat slave raiding), available at http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/10925.htm (last visited Dec. 
2, 2003). 
 129. See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the 
United States, 40 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 743, 747 (2002); John Boli, Sovereignty from a World 
Polity Perspective, in PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 74, at 53, 55–56. 
 130. See Boli, supra note 129, at 55–56. 
091504 COOK.DOC 10/18/2004  9:55 AM 
2004] THE STRATEGIC CONTINGENCY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 113 
common need, recognized in nearly every culture, to assert political 
order to protect society from anarchy.131 
Territory was an obvious, reasonably determinable coordination 
point for this aggregate preference.132  Jean Bodin formally articulated 
this principle in 1586, connecting the French monarchy with absolute, 
indivisible, and perpetual sovereignty over a defined political entity, 
France.133  Hugo Grotius also presupposed the foundational need for 
distinct political units defined by autonomy from external interfer-
ence.134  The practical requirement for this principle was dramatically 
demonstrated by the unbridled catastrophe of the Thirty Years War.  
The Treaty of Westphalia essentially institutionalized sovereign non-
intervention as a European legal rule in order to enable monarchs to 
curb the internecine conflict of sub-state factions.135  Thus, non-
intervention was the linchpin principle for the sovereign state. 
As Europe expanded its political control around the world, the 
rule traveled with it.136  Europe did not initially recognize any non-
intervention rule in regards to its relations with colonized peoples.  
The consolidation of nations and race to global empire also severely 
strained against the rule’s constraints.  The same incentives which 
 
 131. See, e.g., Jianming Shen, National Sovereignty and Human Rights in a Positive Law 
Context, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 417, 420 (2000) (noting the recognition of principles similar to 
Western notions of state sovereignty in the Chinese, Indian and Burmese cultures). 
 132. It was not, however, the only conceivable coordination point.  Other civilizations 
adopted different organizational references.  In East Asia, for example, civilizational spheres 
were historically more significant than political/territorial boundaries.  See Michel Oskenberg, 
The Issue of Sovereignty in the Asian Historical Context, in PROBLEMATIC SOVEREIGNTY, supra 
note 74, at 83, 86–92.  A conceptually useful game theory analogy for this original, pre-
sovereignty position is the “battle of the sexes.”  This coordination game is based on a hypo-
thetical situation where a husband and wife intend to go away for the weekend.  The husband 
would rather go to the mountains and the wife to the beach, but they both prefer to spend the 
weekend together.  The following table reflects the utility payoffs for each player based upon 
the other player’s move. 
 Wife to Mountains Wife to Beach 
Husband to Mountains H = 2; W = 1 H = 0; W = 0 
Husband to Beach H = 0; W = 0 H = 1; W = 2 
Under these conditions, it does not make a great deal of qualitative difference to the original 
actors which coordination point becomes the equilibrium; the important thing is that one be se-
lected, after which all actors are significantly better off.  See generally Krasner, supra note 53 
(discussing the effect of power on game payoffs). 
 133. See Boli, supra note 129, at 56 (citing JEAN BODIN, SIX LIVRES DE LA REPUBLIQUE 
I.8–II.5 (1576)). 
 134. See Shen, supra note 131, at 420–21 (citing HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND 
PEACE 28–44 (Francis H. Kelsey trans., 1925) (1625)). 
 135. See Shen, supra note 131, at 421. 
 136. Oskenberg, supra note 132, at 85–86. 
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prompted the rule’s original emergence, however, applied with equal 
force in the international context.  Additionally, the political and cul-
tural dominance of the European sovereignty norm defined and con-
ditioned emerging non-European national elites, effectively foreclos-
ing other organizational possibilities.137  Aspiring nations of every 
stripe envied the rule because it represented the legal possibility of 
their eventual sovereign autonomy; once established, young states en-
thusiastically asserted its significance to hedge against the preroga-
tives of more capable senior actors.138  Thus, despite vast contrasts of 
preferred political organization across different cultural, historical, 
and geographic contexts, the principle of non-intervention became a 
standard coordination point for the entire international system. 
The principle is consequently identified in a vast, diverse multi-
tude of legal texts and instruments.  A host of global and regional 
treaties,139 a continuous stream of United Nations resolutions,140 the 
 
 137. Id. at 86–87.  Returning to the “battle of the sexes” analogy, supra note 132, once the 
key European powers had chosen the proverbial mountains (territorial sovereignty) around 
which to coordinate the non-intervention norm, actors wishing to join the game were almost 
utility-bound to do the same.  The following pay-off matrix reflects the situation confronted by 
an actor (A) attempting to enter the European-dominated international structure: 
 Europeans Maintain Norm Europeans Abandon Norm 
A Adapts to Norm A = 2; E = 3 A = -1; E = -1 
A Rejects Norm A = -2; E = 3 A = 1; E = -1 
Rejecting the norm placed incoming players (A) at a decisive disadvantage against other actors 
willing to play by the European rules.  A tentatively useful historical demonstration of this ef-
fect is the comparative colonial experiences of China and Japan.  China rejected the European 
sovereignty norm, attempting to treat the Europeans as unruly barbarians, best dealt with 
through marginal concessions.  Consequently, China was incorporated into the international 
system as a compartmentalized client of westernized imperial states.  In contrast, Japan, after a 
fitful start, rapidly adapted its domestic organizational structure to compatibility with Western 
territorial sovereignty norms—and consequently had a relatively fine stay in the mountains as a 
peer of the Western imperial states.  See generally Oksenberg, supra note 132. 
 138. See Dino Kritsiotis, Reappraising Policy Objections to Humanitarian Intervention, 19 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1005, 1009 (1998) (“States jealously treasure the principle of non-intervention 
and it is the chief envy of aspiring states because it is the legal insurance of their sovereign exis-
tence.”).  In the American experience of evolution from colony to sovereign state, these phe-
nomena are demonstrated by the American Declaration of Independence (1776) and the Mon-
roe Doctrine (1823). 
 139. See, e.g., Franco-American Treaty of Alliance, Feb. 6, 1778, U.S.-Fr., 8 Stat. 6; Treaty of 
Amity and Commerce, Feb. 6, 1778, U.S.-Fr., 8 Stat. 12; Convention Concerning the Duties and 
Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife, Feb. 20, 1928, art. 1, 46 Stat. 2749, 2750, 134 
L.N.T.S. 25, 51; Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 8, 49 
Stat. 3097, 3100, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 25; Pact of the League of Arab States, Mar. 22, 1945, art. 8, 70 
U.N.T.S. 237, 254; Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, art. 18, 119 
U.N.T.S. 3, 58; Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, art. 4, 479 U.N.T.S. 
39, 74, reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 766, 768 (1963); Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-
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pronouncements of the International Court of Justice and generations 
of international legal scholars,141 and the incorporation of non-
intervention as a foundational principle of both the League of Na-
tions Covenant142 and UN Charter143 have confirmed the rule’s formal 
primacy.  In principle, non-intervention reigns as the supreme jus co-
gens norm of international law. 
The last century, however, has witnessed a series of strategic ad-
justments substantially affecting the non-intervention principle.  The 
experience of the two world wars, and in particular of the humanitar-
ian atrocities committed prior to and during them, altered the strate-
gic cultural assumptions of pre–World War Western elites.  The non-
intervention norm was qualified by an ideological commitment to 
“never again” allow the emergence of such dangerous and catastro-
phically inhumane conditions.  This shift was pushed in a somewhat 
different direction during the Cold War as the rival ideological aspira-
tions of the two opposing blocs gave rise to strategic values on both 
sides that essentially assumed a duty to continuously intervene in the 
domestic affairs of client and contested states.144  With the end of the 
 
operation in Europe, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292; Charter of Paris for a New Europe of the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Nov. 21, 1990, 30 I.L.M. 190, 196 (1991). 
 140. Kritsiotis, supra note 138, at 1008–09 n.6 and accompanying text.  See, e.g., G.A. Res. 
2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965) (adopted by 109 
votes to zero with an abstention cast by the United Kingdom); Declaration on Principles of In-
ternational Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 
121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) (adopted by consensus); Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 
U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974); Annex to the Declara-
tion of the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, G.A. 
Res. 36/301, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 31, art. 1, at 79, U.N. Doc. A/36/761 (1982) 
(adopted by 120 votes to twenty-two with six abstentions). 
 141. Kritsiotis, supra note 138, at 1009 n.7 and accompanying text.  See, e.g., Corfu Channel 
(merits) (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Apr. 9); Nicaragua Case, supra note 40, at 108; 
AUGUSTUS GRANVILLE STAPELTON, INTERVENTION AND NON-INTERVENTION OR THE 
FOREIGN POLICY OF GREAT BRITAIN FROM 1790 TO 1865 (1866); ELLERY C. STOWELL, 
INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1921); J.E.S. FAWCETT, INTERVENTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 103 RECUEIL DES COURS 342 (1961); IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 289 (5th ed. 1998); Dominic McGoldrick, The Principle of Non-
Intervention: Human Rights, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PRINCIPLES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF MICHAEL AKEHURST 85, 87–94 (Vaughan 
Lowe & Colin Warbrick eds., 1994). 
 142. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 10, reprinted in 13 AM. J. INT’L L. 128, 131–32 
(Supp. 1919). 
 143. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, paras. 4, 7, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT’L L. 190, 191 (Supp. 1945). 
 144. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible 
Influence over Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (1989).  Continuing with the game the-
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Cold War, the West possessed an unchecked preponderance of inter-
vention capabilities.  Moreover, there was a dramatic increase in the 
availability and attention given to information regarding international 
humanitarian crises, partly as a result of increased IGO and NGO ac-
tivity.  These factors, combined with the residual Cold War penchant 
for benevolent meddling created the strategic conditions for the phe-
nomenon of humanitarian intervention. 
The state practice ensuing from these conditions is predictably 
counter to the non-intervention rule.  During the Cold War, interven-
tions were frequent but were almost invariably either covert or at 
least couched in terms compatible with the non-intervention princi-
ple, such as self-defense or invitation.  Since 1991, the West, and the 
United States in particular, has engaged or assisted in a continuous 
series of significant humanitarian intervention operations.145  While 
these actions have to date been either authorized or eventually rati-
fied by the UN Security Council, they nevertheless represent overt, 
forceful interventions in matters classically understood to be within 
the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of the sovereign state.  Increas-
ingly, these interventions are asserted as being themselves com-
manded by legal obligation.146 
In the post–September 11 environment and the run-up to the in-
vasion of Iraq in March 2003, the United States has asserted and 
dramatically acted on a purported right to preemptive self defense.147  
 
ory analysis, supra notes 132 and 137, these strategic cultural changes altered the relevant pay-
off matrix in the eyes of Western elites, changing the character of the game. 
 B Intervenes B Maintains Non-intervention 
A Intervenes A = -1; B = -1 A = 2; B = -2 
A Maintains Non-Intervention A = -2; B = 2 A = 0; B = 0 
The World Wars and the Cold War revealed that the sovereign non-intervention “mountains” 
could be dangerous and unpleasant in the event of adversary defection.  In order to avoid the 
recurrence of such catastrophes, states had to at least occasionally go to the beach (intervene).  
Thus, the utility structure for non-intervention began to look more like a prisoner’s dilemma 
game.  Under these conditions, the likelihood of defection from the rule dramatically increases. 
 145. Northern Iraq (1991), Somalia (1992–93), Liberia/Sierra Leone (1993), Haiti (1994), 
Rwanda (1994), Bosnia (1995), Burundi (1996), Albania (1997), East Timor (1999), and Kosovo 
(1999).  See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST 
THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS  (2002) (discussing evolution of international use of force 
rules). 
 146. See, e.g., Julie A. Mertus, Legitimizing the Use of Force in Kosovo, 15 ETHICS & INT’L 
AFF. 133, 140 (2001) (book review). 
 147. See generally WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2003). 
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This practice represents a further erosion in the absolute non-
intervention principle. 
Correspondingly, contemporary legal scholarship tends to ac-
knowledge an increasing contingency in the legal prohibition on in-
tervention.148  To date, this development has apparently not been 
formally signified in any international instrument; states remain un-
derstandably reticent to formally endorse the weakening of the prin-
cipal legal guarantee of their existence.  Non-intervention thus re-
mains both a functionally and formally significant legal consideration.  
It is apparent, however, that the legal rule is no longer absolutely 
prohibitory but rather constitutes a sort of jurisprudential balancing 
of political, normative, and cultural considerations.149 
C. Landmines 
In comparison to the long-evolving proscriptions on intervention 
and slavery, the purported legal prohibition of landmines is a very re-
cent phenomenon.  Landmines were first widely used during World 
War I.150  Their conventional purpose was to deny or impede move-
ment of enemy military forces through mined areas.  Through most of 
the twentieth century they were regulated only by the customary 
principles associated with the law of war: necessity and proportional-
ity to the military objective.151  The proliferating use of mines during 
the wars of liberation of the 1960s and 1970s, however, combined with 
the concomitant (often deliberate) economic and human harm to ci-
vilian populations inflicted by the weapons, prompted a movement to 
formalize these legal limitations.152 
This effort was incorporated into the 1980 Convention on Con-
ventional Weapons (CCW).153  The CCW purported to proscribe the 
 
 148. See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note 145, at 172–73; Kritsiotis, supra note 138, at 1047–48.  For 
response, see Shen, supra note 131, at 429–30. 
 149. An analogy from United States constitutional jurisprudence is standard of review.  In 
the past, intervention was only legally permissible under specified legal conditions akin to “strict 
scrutiny;” today, intervention is considered under the more permissive “rational basis” test. 
 150. See Howard S. Levie, Landmines: a Deadly Legacy: By the Arms Project of Human 
Rights Watch/Physicians for Human Rights, 88 AM. J. INT’L. L. 565, 565 (1994) (book review). 
 151. See Jodi Preusser Mustoe, Note, The 1997 Treaty to Ban the Use of Landmines: Was 
President Clinton’s Refusal to Become a Signatory Warranted?, 27 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 541, 
548 (1999). 
 152. See id. at 546–48. 
 153. Protocol II of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indis-
criminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter CCW Protocol II].  For further 
discussion of CCW Protocol II, dealing with antipersonnel devices and booby-traps, see Yvette 
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use of mines in civilian areas except under specified conditions and 
also required recording or self-destruct features for all emplaced 
mines.154  The efficacy of the CCW was severely impaired, however, 
by its lack of enforcement mechanisms and the fact that it did not 
even formally apply to internal conflicts, where much of the harm 
from landmines was (and is) being sustained.155  The CCW also mus-
tered poor state adherence.156  The Soviets relied heavily on mines in 
their suppression campaigns in Afghanistan, and U.S. planners in-
creasingly incorporated improved mine systems into their doctrine for 
anticipated battles in Korea and Europe.157  Indeed, the rate of em-
placement of landmines actually increased subsequent to the CCW’s 
adoption.158  Thus, the CCW’s independent normative and legal force 
is arguably virtually nil.159 
The end of the Cold War, however, radically changed the appli-
cable global environment.  With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, 
and particularly after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the 
geo-security concerns that had previously trumped all other policy 
and international interests had to contend with an increasingly asser-
tive and resonant human rights agenda.  This phenomenon was par-
ticularly true in the modern secular democracies which entirely domi-
nated the international stage of the 1990s.160 
This strategic cultural shift was reflected in the land mine issue 
area by the establishment of the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines (the Campaign) by U.S. and German humanitarian NGOs 
in 1991.161  This coalition orchestrated an ambitious effort to reshape 
international norms through a network of political operatives, social 
activists, like-minded governments, and in several instances, promi-
nent sympathetic individuals.162  The Campaign’s speed and ability to 
bypass conventional international law-making channels were remark-
 
Politis, Note, The Regulation of an Invisible Enemy: The International Community’s Response to 
Landmine Proliferation, 22 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 465, 472–73 (1999). 
 154. CCW Protocol II, supra note 153, arts. 4, 5, 1342 U.N.T.S. at 169. 
 155. Politis, supra note 153, at 473. 
 156. Only forty-one states had ratified the CCW as of 1999.  See Mustoe, supra note 151, at 
548. 
 157. Indeed, the United States did not ratify the treaty until 1995 so that it could participate 
in the next round of mine treaty negotiations.  See id. 
 158. See id. at 549. 
 159. See id. 
 160. See generally FRANCK, supra note 145. 
 161. See Robert O. Muller, New Partnerships for a New World Order: NGOs, State Actors, 
and International Law in the Post–Cold War World, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 21, 21 (1998). 
 162. See id. at 22–23. 
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able.  Notwithstanding this agility, however, the Campaign’s methods 
were remarkably akin to the pioneering international advocacy of the 
early anti-slavery societies.163 
In 1992, U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) initiated a morato-
rium on the U.S. export of antipersonnel mines that has subsequently 
become U.S. government policy.164  Two years later, campaign activ-
ists persuaded President Clinton to commit to a global ban on land-
mines in a prominent speech to the United Nations.165  This combina-
tion of advocacy and political commitment resulted in a formal 
conference to reassess the CCW in 1995.  The consequent revisions 
addressed several of the technical defects of the original convention: 
they extended the regulations to intrastate conflict, assigned respon-
sibility for removal of emplaced mines, and required the state to enact 
national proscriptions to sanction individual violators.166  Largely due 
to continuing military reliance on landmines by such major powers as 
Russia and China, and the resistance of other states such as India and 
Pakistan, these revisions stopped well short, however, of declaring an 
outright ban on the weapons.167 
This “failure” was a bitter disappointment to the Campaign’s 
chief proponents.168  Once it had become clear that the CCW revision 
conference was not going to enact a prohibition, the Canadian gov-
ernment declared its intention to bypass subsequent UN treaty proc-
ess and host a meeting of like-minded states in 1997 to negotiate a to-
tal ban on mines.169  The Campaign supported this announcement with 
a saturation advocacy effort including prominent visits to landmine 
victims by Diana, Princess of Wales, and public correspondence by re-
tired U.S. military officers.170  The United States temporarily partici-
pated in the negotiation process for this treaty but was unable to se-
cure reservations for advanced technology mines and the Korean 
 
 163. Compare id., with Anti-Slavery International, supra note 75, for illustration of these 
methods. 
 164. See Muller, supra note 161, at 23; see also Patrick Leahy, Major Issues: Landmines, at 
http://leahy.senate.gov/issues/landmines/lm-facts.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2003). 
 165. See Muller, supra note 161, at 23. 
 166. See generally Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-
Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) as Amended, May 3, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1206 (1996) 
(amending CCW Protocol II). 
 167. See Politis, supra note 153, at 479–80. 
 168. See Mustoe, supra note 151, at 549. 
 169. See Muller, supra note 161, at 24–25. 
 170. See id. at 24–25. 
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peninsula which it considered vital to its military doctrine.  Conse-
quently, it withdrew without signing.171 
The resultant Ottawa Convention, which entered into effect in 
1999, commits all state parties to “never under any circumstances” 
use any antipersonnel mines, or to develop, produce, stockpile, pur-
chase or transfer antipersonnel mines.172  The agreement further re-
quires destruction of all existing weapons.  The treaty also imposes 
extensive reporting requirements regarding progress towards elimina-
tion of landmines on its adherents.173  The agreement has elicited an 
impressive level of international support, with 139 states parties as of 
October 1, 2003.174 
The customary force of the landmine ban, however, is minimal.  
The treaty itself fails to mobilize tangible capabilities to actually dis-
arm or destroy existing mines.175  This is a particular problem, as the 
countries most afflicted by mines are invariably also those that have 
the least resources to remove them.176  Thus, the parties are them-
selves unlikely to fully comply with the timelines established in the 
treaty. 
More significantly, the states that have not signed the treaty in-
clude the most militarily active and landmine-reliant countries in the 
world.177  Millions of new mines are purportedly laid each year.178  
Moreover, these states’ militaries continue to develop more versatile 
mine weapon systems that would be proscribed were they to sign the 
Ottawa Convention.  Consequently, it appears likely that these states 
will continue to regularly use these weapons into the foreseeable fu-
ture. 
A less quantifiable, but nonetheless significant barrier to compli-
ance in the U.S. context is a cultural hostility to NGO-sponsored law, 
 
 171. Politis, supra note 153, at 484. 
 172. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, art. 1, 36 I.L.M. 1507 [hereinaf-
ter Ottawa Convention]. 
 173. See Ottawa Convention, supra note 172, art. 7, 36 I.L.M. at 1512. 
 174. See Arms Control Association, Fact Sheets: The Ottawa Convention: Signatories and 
States-Parties, at http://armscontrol.org/factsheets/ottawasigs.asp (last visited Nov. 21, 2003). 
 175. See Politis, supra note 153, at 488–89. 
 176. See id. 
 177. See id. at 486. 
 178. Michael Polkinghorne & James Cockayne, Dealing with the Risks and Responsibilities 
of Landmines and Their Clearance, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1187, 1189 (2002).  This statistic 
dates from 1996.  A review of the Internet elicits a range of figures with the number 2.5 million 
from most electronic sources, but there is no substantiation for this claim. 
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and the Ottawa Convention in particular, that has developed in the 
country’s military and foreign policy instruments at least in part due 
to frustration with that treaty’s unorthodox, accelerated ratification 
process.179  This tendency was exacerbated by the replacement of the 
Clinton administration with the Bush administration, which, as dis-
cussed above, is generally reluctant to promote international legal 
constraints.180  Thus, the single state that could most contribute the 
capabilities necessary to effect compliance with the prohibition is also 
perhaps least likely to sign it without substantial change in its own 
current strategic values. 
The lack of a customary legal basis for the landmine ban is also 
reflected in the legal literature.181  Consequently, notwithstanding the 
Campaign’s tremendous efforts and impressive results, the Ottawa 
Convention’s ban on landmines is legally binding only in regards to 
parties to that treaty.  In regards to the rest of the international com-
munity it is a contested norm.  It is conceivable that, with the adop-
tion of the treaty by additional powerful states, it may well gain more 
generally-applicable legal status in the future.182  It is also quite possi-
ble, however, that the dominant actors in the issue area will continue 
to view landmines as vital components of their military capabilities 
and prefer a CCW-type regulatory scheme.  Without some change in 
the relative balance of relevant capabilities, it is unlikely that the 
Campaign will be able to compel coordination around their preferred 
legal prohibition. 
V.  ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION 
The cases lend tentative support to the strategically contingent 
theory of international law developed in this paper.  In the slavery 
case, a norm that emerged early in the dominant international actor 
remained contested during a long strategic process of shifting capa-
bilities and existing path dependencies which were strongly permis-
sive of slavery.  Once these components were decisively arrayed be-
hind the rule, the operation of the informational functions of the 
League of Nations and UN provided the mechanism for international 
legitimization of the rule.  More recent attempts to broaden the pro-
hibition to include “slavery-like” practices, however, have run afoul 
 
 179. Cf. Donna Marie Verchio, Just Say No! The SIrUS Project: Well Intentioned, but Un-
necessary and Superfluous, 51 A.F. L. REV. 183, 224–25 (2001). 
 180. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 181. See, e.g., Polkinghorne & Cockayne, supra note 178, at 1189. 
 182. But see Baxter, supra note 37. 
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of persisting cultural realities and do not, as of yet, command suffi-
cient adherence to be considered part of the content of the legal rule. 
In contrast, the strategic trends that consolidated the interna-
tional abolition of slavery have tended to undermine the legal prohi-
bition on intervention.  As the most capable international actors’ stra-
tegic values have become increasingly responsive to readily available 
information on humanitarian catastrophes or nascent security risks, 
international law has correspondingly become less tolerant of the 
sovereign idiosyncrasies permitted by the non-intervention rule. 
In the case of landmines, similar strategic cultural and informa-
tional developments have prompted a substantial effort to effect an 
international legal prohibition of the weapons.  This initiative, how-
ever, is unsupported by the actors with the preponderance of relevant 
strategic capabilities and, consequently, lacks legal force.  Thus, there 
does appear to be, as predicted, a causal relationship between com-
plex strategic variables and legal continuity or change.  The empirical 
endorsement of the particular theory developed in this note remains 
tentative, however, because these results could conceivably be ex-
plained by different independent variables.  In other words, while 
strategic conditions, broadly defined as the international inter-actoral 
environment, almost certainly have a causal relationship with interna-
tional law, it may well be that different or more precisely calibrated 
independent variables—for example, domestic government type, 
NGO density, information technology, etc.—would yield more accu-
rate empirical predictions.  There are also methodological problems 
with extrapolating the evaluative results from the reasonably deter-
minable prohibitory rules considered here to the general field of in-
ternational law, particularly its formal secondary rules—such as sov-
ereign equality. 
The complex strategic contingency of international law articu-
lated above nevertheless has significant doctrinal implications for 
both IR and international legal practitioners.  The theory directly un-
dermines the hard formalist claims espoused by some legal commen-
tators.  Correspondingly, it rebuts the conception of jus cogens as 
perpetually nonderogable, metaphysically universal norms.  Jus co-
gens may remain an analytically useful concept to denote a class of 
particularly strong, or constitutive, legal principles—such rules, how-
ever, are subject to the same process of strategic renegotiation and 
content evolution that characterizes the rest of international law. 
The theory also emphasizes the enduring relevance of interna-
tional law as a significant, facilitative component of world politics.  In-
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ternational actors are strategically affected, and consequently do—
and should—care about the default coordinative behaviors institu-
tionalized by legal rules. 
Finally, the theory and cases offer a tentative prediction regard-
ing the direction of future development of international law: toward 
the aggregate preferences of the most capable and informationally-
engaged societies.183  In the contemporary world environment, this 
dominant consensus is the secular humanitarianism of modern West-
ern culture.  Consequently, future international legal evolution will 
likely continue to erode the exclusive prerogatives of the state in fa-
vor of various human dignity norms. 
Methodologically, these conditions point to a need for greater at-
tention to systemic international conditions in the study and practice 
of international law.  Future legal research programs of greater ana-
lytical precision will tend to improve our understanding of continuity 
and change in international law and correspondingly reduce some of 
the indeterminacy and rule skepticism currently associated with the 
discipline. 
Randall H. Cook 
 
 
 183. While this trend may seem intuitively self-evident, it is significant that it is not pre-
dicted by the conventional doctrinal conception of international law formation. 
